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ARTICLE DE RECHERCHE

Finding one’s way around various
methodological guidelines for doing
rigorous case studies:
A comparison of four epistemological
frameworks
Marie-José AVENIER1*, Catherine THOMAS**
*Léonard de Vinci Pôle Universitaire, Business Lab, Paris-La Défense, France
**Université Nice Sophia Antipolis, CNRS, GREDEG, UMR 7321, Valbonne, France

ABSTRACT
The expanding popularity of qualitative research, and more particularly case study research, in the field of Information Systems, Organization and Management research,
seems to have been accompanied by an increasing divergence in the forms that this research takes, and by recurrent criticisms concerning its rigor. This paper develops a heuristic framework for guiding the design of a rigorous case study depending on the research’s
goal and epistemological framework, as well as for guiding its evaluation. It also highlights
the fundamental reasons – namely the epistemological ones – for differences in the guidelines offered in the literature for conducting high quality case studies.
In agreement with numerous authors, we argue for contingent evaluation criteria. We
supplement these authors’ works in two ways: (1) we consider various epistemological
frameworks that do not appear in the classifications that they use, especially including critical realism and pragmatic constructivism; (2) we propose a set of contingent criteria to be
used as a heuristic device for critically and knowledgeably building rigorous case studies
within different epistemological traditions.
Keywords: Qualitative research, case study, rigor, critical realism, pragmatic constructivism.
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RÉSUMÉ
Les études qualitatives, et plus particulièrement les études de cas, se sont fortement diffusées dans les recherches en systèmes d’information, organisation et management. Cette popularité croissante s’est accompagnée d’une multiplication des formes possibles d’études de
cas, entrainant des critiques récurrentes quant à leur rigueur. Cet article propose des repères heuristiques pour guider la réalisation d’études de cas rigoureuses et leur évaluation
en lien avec l’objectif et le cadre épistémologique de la recherche. Il souligne les raisons fondamentales, principalement d’ordre épistémologique, qui expliquent que des repères très
différents coexistent dans la littérature au sujet de la conduite d’études de cas rigoureuses.
À la suite de nombreux auteurs, nous argumentons en faveur de critères d’évaluation
contingents, adaptés au cadre épistémologique retenu pour conduire la recherche. Nous
complétons leurs travaux de deux manières. Nous considérons deux cadres épistémologiques de plus en plus mobilisés dans les recherches mais encore peu discutés dans ces travaux : le réalisme critique et le constructivisme pragmatique. En outre, nous proposons une
mise en perspective des différents critères d’évaluation des recherches qualitatives en lien
avec le cadre épistémologique retenu, proposant ainsi un cadre heuristique pour construire
de façon critique, informée et raisonnée une étude de cas rigoureuse.
Mots-clés : Recherche qualitative, étude de cas, rigueur, réalisme critique, constructivisme
pragmatique.
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FINDING ONE’S WAY AROUND VARIOUS METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES FOR DOING…

“Underlying any form of research is
a philosophy of science (…).
It is better to choose a philosophy
of science than to inherit one by
default.” Van de Ven (2007, p. 36)

INTRODUCTION
Although the amount of qualitative
research being performed has soared
over the last forty years, few qualitative
papers end up being published in top
tier academic journals such as MIS
Quarterly (MISQ), Organization Science and Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ). For instance, only 22 casestudy based papers were published
between 1995 and 2000 in AMJ, ASQ,
and SMJ (Gibbert et al., 2008), and
merely 10% of the articles published in
MISQ over the period 2011-2012 were
qualitative papers (Avison and Malaurent, 2013). Criticisms concerning the
rigor of qualitative research have accompanied its development (Weber,
2004; Gibbert et al., 2008; Pratt, 2009).
There exist a wide variety of methodological approaches to qualitative research. These include Grounded Theorizing (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser,
2004; Charmaz, 2006); Ethnography
(Garfinkel, 1967; Suchman, 1987); Case
Studies (Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991; Yin,
1989, 2009; Klein and Myers, 1999;
Dubé and Paré, 2003; Gioia, 2010,
2012; Wynn and Williams, 2012); Design studies (Baskerville and Pryes,
1999; Carlsson, 2007; Denyer et al.,
2008; Pascal et al., 2013); Action Research (Davison et al., 2012); and Critical Research (Myers and Klein, 2011). It
is difficult to classify these methods. Indeed, a case study can be conducted

with methods close to ethnography
(Klein and Myers, 1999) or to grounded
theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Gioia
et al., 2012). There is also some overlap
between action research and design research (Avison and Malaurent, 2013),
as well as between action research and
critical research (e.g. participatory action research in Kemmis and McTaggart, 2008). However, these methods all
share the characteristic of being “smallN studies” (Tsoukas, 2011).
While this diversity of methods is a
source of richness (Avison and
Malurent, 2013), it is also a source of
confusion when it comes to deciding
how to conduct or evaluate a qualitative research project in practice because of the multitude of justification
and evaluation guidelines. This multitude of guidelines stems not only from
the diversity of methods but also from
the variety of philosophies of knowledge – otherwise known as epistemological frameworks – in which these
methods can be carried out (Gephart,
2004 ; Mingers, 2004; Langley and
Royer, 2006 ; Smith, 2006; Yanow,
2006; Pratt, 2009). Indeed, any research
project takes place within an explicit or
implicit philosophy of knowledge (Van
de Ven, 2007). If the research method
mobilized is not consistent with, and
adapted to the research’s epistemological framework, the research results will
be limited and superficial (Gephart,
2004), if valid at all.
To move forward, certain scholars
have offered guidelines that are specific to a particular epistemological
framework. For instance Eisenhardt
(1989, 1991), Yin (1989, 2009), and
Dubé and Paré (2003) for positivism
and post-positivism; Guba and Lincoln
63
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(1989), Klein and Myers (1999), and
Denzin and Lincoln (2003a, 2003b) for
interpretivism; Wynn and Williams
(2012) for critical realism; Avenier and
Parmentier Cajaiba (2012), and Albert
and Couture (2014) for pragmatic constructivism; and Myers and Klein
(2011) for critical studies.
However, these guidelines are generic and hence cannot be straightforwardly applied. As noted by Pratt
(2009) there is no accepted “boilerplate” for writing up qualitative research. So, in practice, there are still
strong critiques concerning the rigor of
qualitative research which have been
highlighted by the editors of top tier
journals in the fields of Information
Systems, Organization, and Management research. For instance: “What is
new here?” (Gephart, 2004); “Findings
often appear to lack grounding in
data” (Gephart, 2004); “Methodology is
underspecified” (Gephart, 2004; Pratt,
2009); mistaking descriptive studies
and grounded theorizing (Suddaby,
2006); “Telling about data, not showing it” or “Showing too much data, and
not interpreting it”, mixing guidelines
offered by various authors (such as, in
an example cited by Pratt (2009), striving to control for variance in an inductive narrative study), and inappropriately mixing inductive and deductive
strategies (Pratt, 2009); “Insufficient
theoretical contribution” (Ågerfalk,
2014).
The purpose of this paper is to offer
insights that can help researchers navigate various kinds of guidelines for
doing rigorous qualitative research in
Information systems, Organization,
and Management sciences. These insights for adapting the chosen method

to the research’s specific context are
based upon a deep understanding of
knowledge goal and the justification
criteria in each epistemological framework. In other words we aim to provide insights for using qualitative
methods critically and knowledgeably
within a context that makes different
assumptions (Mingers, 2001).
Given article length constraints, the
scope of this paper is limited to addressing the quality markers of only
one type of qualitative research, namely the case study method. We focus on
this method for two main reasons: (1)
it is the qualitative method that is most
diffused in Information Systems, Organization and Management research,
and (2) it can take on very diverse
forms.
This paper is organized in three parts.
In the first part, we examine various
classifications of epistemological frameworks and briefly describe the founding assumptions of four solidly argued
epistemological frameworks that are
frequently mobilized in contemporary
research. In the second part, we discuss how case studies can be conducted and justified in each epistemological
framework. In the third part, we discuss the theoretical findings of this
methodological investigation, and in
the conclusion we draw their implications for (research) practice.

1. FOUNDING ASSUMPTIONS
OF CONTEMPORARY
EPISTEMOLOGICAL
FRAMEWORKS
Referring to Piaget’s (1967) definition
of epistemology as “the study of valu-
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able knowledge constitution”, we define an epistemological framework as a
conception of knowledge relying on a
set of mutually consistent founding assumptions relative to the subjects that
epistemology addresses. Hence these
assumptions concern the origin and
nature of knowledge (epistemic assumptions), how it is elaborated
(methodological assumptions), and
how it is justified. Most epistemological frameworks also rely on founding
assumptions that concern what exists
(ontological assumptions). So-called
“truth theories of knowledge” depend
on epistemological frameworks and
are directly associated with the epistemological assumptions (Klein and
Myers, 1999; Sandberg, 2005; Boisot
and McKelvey, 2010). They specify
knowledge’s status and generation
goal.

1.1. A variety of classifications
To date, there is no general agreement among scholars on how to classify the epistemological frameworks
frequently mobilized in contemporary
research in Information Systems, Organization and Management sciences. A
traditional classification relies on a dualistic partition between positivism and
anti-positivism (Wicks and Freeman,
1998) or positivism and interpretivism
(Weber, 2004; Goldkul, 2008). Other
classifications distinguish between
foundational, quasi-foundational, and
non-foundational
epistemological
frameworks (Amis and Silk, 2008); between various currents within interpretivism and postpositivism (Cunliffe,
2011, in an updating of Morgan and
Smircich’s (1980) typology); between

positivism, interpretivism and critical
research (Orlikowski and Baroudi,
1991); between positivism, post-positivism, critical theory (and related theorizing), constructivism, and participatory inquiry (Guba and Lincoln, 2007);
and between logical positivism, relativism, pragmatism, and realism (Van
de Ven, 2007). In the latter classification, Van de Ven further distinguishes
between two different traditions within
realism, namely scientific realism and
critical realism. The critical realist
framework has been increasingly mobilized over the past 10 years particularly in IS research (see MISQ’s SI on
critical realism in IS research, 2013).
Amidst this lack of consensus, there
exist a number of epistemological
frameworks that rely on explicitly stated founding assumptions that are mutually consistent and shared within various contemporary communities of
researchers. These epistemological
frameworks are those of positivism
and post-positivism, critical realism,
pragmatic constructivism, and interpretivism. Because of the increasing diffusion of these four epistemological
frameworks in Information Systems,
Organization, and Management research we will concentrate on them in
the present paper.
It is noteworthy that in contrast to
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), we do
not consider critical research (nor participatory inquiry) as a philosophy of
knowledge that would stand on an
equal footing with positivism and interpretivism (Orlikowski and Baroudi,
1991; Myers and Klein, 2011). Rather,
along with Rowe (2009), we view critical research as a methodological approach guided by a systematic inten65
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tion of critique of what, in an IS, may
hinder the blossoming of human potential. It can be knowledgeably and
critically adapted to be conducted in
various epistemological frameworks
(Stahl, 2008 quoted by Rowe, 2009;
Guba and Lincoln, 2007; Rowe, 2009),
particularly those that posit both epistemic and ontological relativism, like
interpretivism (Rowe, 2009). Indeed,
for Myers and Klein (2011), it is easier
to bridge critical and interpretive research than it is to bridge critical and
positivist research; more precisely, the
affinity between interpretive and critical research is much closer than that of
either one to positivist research.

being associated with pragmatism and
the English one with social constructivism (Lincoln and Lynham, 2011) and
post-modernism (Avenier, 2011).

In addition, given that the mobilization of critical research in frameworks
that posit ontological realism is still
subject to caution, in this paper we
will solely discuss it in an interpretivist
framework.

Since Popper (1959), post-positivism
differs from positivism by criticizing
the role of induction wherein universal
laws could be derived from a set of
particular observations; hence, one can
only falsify, but not confirm, hypotheses (Gephart, 2013). According to
Weber (2004), contemporary post-positivist researchers recognize the limitation of the knowledge they seek to
build, understanding that their culture,
experience, history (and so on) impact
the research work they undertake and
thus their results. More recently, scholars challenged this framework outlining that social sciences have to deal
with complex, messy interactive and
dynamic social processes characterizing human social behavior (Boisot and
McKelvey, 2010). Recognizing this
complexity directs the authors to a scientific realist framework; in this framework, exploration becomes crucial, abductive reasoning allows discovering
underlying patterns; justification of
knowledge resides primarily in its contribution to efficacious adaptability and

1.2. Brief presentation
of the epistemological
frameworks considered
in this paper
The various epistemological traditions are presented in an ideal-typical
fashion: currents within each of these
traditions share core founding assumptions but may differ on certain nuances. More precisely, the authors that
are cited do not necessarily have a uniform conception of the tradition to
which they are associated, particularly
in the interpretivist tradition as well as
in the positivist and post-positivist
ones. Moreover, as detailed in §1.2.3,
there is an important difference between the French and the English constructivist traditions, the French one

1.2.1. Positivism
and post-positivism
Positivism posits ontological and
epistemic realism. More precisely it
posits the existence of an objective
world that can be described and represented in a direct mirror-like manner
(Gephart, 2013). As such, truth arises
from a correspondence between a
claim and empirically observed facts
(Boisot and McKelvey, 2010).
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survival rather than to the attainment
of a predictive law-like truth (Boisot
and McKelvey, 2010).
The diversity of currents within the
positivist and post-positivist traditions
generate richness. It also constitutes a
weakness because of the possible risks
of inconsistency within research projects carried out in this tradition (Smith,
2006). For example, the statistical techniques used in positivism and postpositivism for testing hypotheses are
not compatible with the assumption of
complex reality frequently made in IS,
Organization or Management research.
Indeed, these techniques rely on Gaussian probability distributions. Those
are based upon an ontological assumption of atomistic reality which
“assumes that human beings are autonomous subjects, whose interests
and desires are transparent to themselves and independent from the interests and desires of others” (Calas and
Smircich, 1999, in Boisot and McKelvey, 2010: 418). This atomistic ontology is not compatible with the assumption of complex reality which
emphasizes interdependency (Boisot
and McKelvey, 2010). In a more general way Smith (2006), as a critical realist,
outlines that the positivist notion of
causality defined as the empirical conjunction of events is inconsistent with
the experience of Information Systems
research.

(Mingers et al., 2013). Indeed, an increasing number of researchers argue
that critical realism could provide a coherent and robust underpinning philosophy (Carlsson, 2007; De Vaujany,
2008; Mingers, 2004; Mingers et al.,
2013) and thus resolve some long
standing theory-practice inconsistencies identified in research conducted
within the standard account of the
frameworks of positivism and interpretivism (Smith, 2006).

1.2.2. Critical realism

The term “critical realism” arose from
the combination of the terms “transcendental realism” and “critical naturalism” (Bhaskar, 1998a). As such, critical realism defends a strong realist
ontological assumption that posits that
there exists a world independent of
our knowledge (intransitive dimension); and even though it recognizes
the specificity and the emergent properties of the social realm, it asserts that
“social sciences can be sciences in exactly the same sense as natural ones”
(Bhaskar, 1998a: xvii). At the same
time, critical realism accepts the relativism of knowledge (epistemic relativism – transitive dimension) which is
socially and historically constructed.
Nevertheless, epistemic relativity does
not mean judgmental relativity, i.e. that
all theoretical productions are equally
valid; once expressed theoretical productions become available for investigation and it is possible to eliminate alternative explanations by empirically
testing their potential effects (Mingers,
2004).

Critical realism has been developing
for some years from the foundational
work of Roy Bhaskar (1978). There has
been a growing interest, particularly in
the field of Information Systems

In line with transcendental realism,
critical realism develops a stratified
conception of the world. More precisely it posits that the real domain is composed of generative mechanisms and
67
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structures, existing independently
from, but capable of producing patterns of events that we observe; the actual domain is the domain in which
observed events occur; the empirical
domain is the domain of experienced
events (Bhaskar, 1978, 1998b). Generative mechanisms and structures have
emergent power, and whether this
power manifests or not depends on
the contextual conditions; in other
words, social structures have emergent
powers that are irreducible to those of
their constituent parts (Tsoukas, 1989).
Thus, causal explanation is not about
the deterministic association of patterns of events but the activation (or
non-activation) of causal powers under
certain conditions (Tsoukas, 1989).
Here, researchers aim to know what
are the structures, the generative
mechanisms and the contextual conditions responsible for the patterns of
events observed.
Finally, for Bhaskar (1998b) the
specificity of social sciences is that objects of social scientific inquiry only
ever manifest themselves in open systems; thus the absence of closed systems denies the possibility of decisive
test and prediction. This means that
criteria for the development of theories
in social sciences “must be explanatory
and non-predictive” (Bhaskar, 1998d,
p. 225).

1.2.3. Pragmatic constructivism
Piaget is the first author who introduced the notion of “constructivist
epistemology” in 1967. Glasersfeld’s
(1984, 2001, 2005) radical constructivism is in the direct lineage of Piaget’s constructivism. Pragmatic con-

structivism is another name for radical
constructivism, which has also been
called “teleological constructivism” (Le
Moigne, 2001; Avenier, 2010) to underscore the teleological character of the
knowledge process in this epistemological framework, a feature that Le
Moigne (1995) emphasizes in his refinements of Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism – and to which Le Moigne
fully subscribes.
The qualifying term “pragmatic” has
been considered preferable to the
other two labels because it highlights
that, in this epistemological framework, knowledge claims justification
and testing is performed in relation
with intentional actions these claims
are considered to illuminate (Avenier
and Parmentier Cajaiba, 2012). Hence
the term “pragmatic” is taken in its
philosophical sense, and particularly
the sense associated with the work of
the pragmatist philosophers William
James (1976/1912) and John Dewey
(1938). Consequently, pragmatic constructivism corresponds to the kind of
pragmatism that Ågerfalk (2010) suggests exploring for design science, and
that Goldkuhl (2012) considers to constitute an appropriate philosophy for
action research and design research.
The term “pragmatic” has also been
considered preferable to that of “radical”, because the qualifying term “radical” sparked a certain amount of confusion in the understanding of this
epistemological framework. Indeed, it
has often been interpreted to mean
that “[radical] constructivism denies reality. But this it does not. It only denies
that we can rationally know a reality
beyond our experience” (Glasersfeld,
2001, italics in the original text).

68
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In 2005, Glasersfeld explained why
he used the epithet “radical” for the
first time in 1974, in a contribution presenting his interpretation of Piaget’s
constructivism: “It was intended in the
sense that William James (1976) [originally published in 1912] had used in
his radical empiricism, i.e., meaning
“going to the roots” or “uncompromising”. I chose it because at the time
many developmental psychologists
were mentioning Piaget’s constructivism but without going into its epistemological implications. What they
called construction seemed to refer to
the fact that children acquire adult
knowledge not all at once, but in small
pieces. I did not think that this was a
revelation and therefore called their
approach “trivial constructivism””
(Glasersfeld, 2005, p. 10).
Hence Glasersfeld used the qualifying term “radical” solely to differentiate
his conception of constructivism from
what he called a “trivial” conception of
constructivism, rather than from a possibly “moderate” conception of constructivism – as it is sometimes thought
or asserted (e.g. Van den Belt, 2003).
The epistemic assumption posited in
pragmatic constructivism – namely
that, in the knowledge process, whatever stems from the situation under investigation is inseparably intertwined
with whatever stems from the inquirer
– leads to epistemic relativism. As explained in §2.4.2 below, this epistemic

relativity does not mean that “anything
goes”.
A peculiarity of this epistemological
framework is that, because of the epistemic assumption it posits, and differently from all the other epistemological frameworks, it refuses to posit any
founding ontological assumptions
(Glasersfeld, 2001; Avenier, 2010). In
particular, this makes the pragmatic
constructivist epistemological framework fundamentally different from
Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) “constructivist paradigm”2. Indeed, the latter
posits a founding ontological assumption of “relativist ontology” which asserts the relative character of whatever
exists and hence attaches this
paradigm to post-modernism rather
than to pragmatism (Avenier, 2011).
This assumption, together with the
epistemic assumption it posits, makes
it judicious to classify Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) “constructivist paradigm”
in interpretivism, as Guba and Lincoln
themselves suggest in the following
statement:
“The
constructivist
paradigm also called the naturalistic,
hermeneutic, or interpretive paradigm
(with slight shadings in meaning)…”
(Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 83).

1.2.4. Interpretivism
Yanow (2006) depicts interpretivism
as an umbrella term subsuming different schools of thought, including those

Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) “constructivist paradigm” is the conception of constructivism that is most diffused in the English academic literature in IS, Organization and Management research, whereas in the
French academic literature in IS pragmatic constructivism is broadly diffused (Rowe, 2009) and Guba and
Lincoln’s conception is little known.

2

69
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drawing (explicitly or implicitly) on
phenomenology, hermeneutics, or
(some) Frankfurt School critical theory
(e.g. Habermas, 1972) along with symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, among others. This is in agreement with Klein and Myers’ (1999) as
well as Sandberg’s (2005) views of interpretivism, which underscore that
there are fairly different forms of interpretivism. For instance (see Table 1 in
§1.3), at one extreme Sandberg’s
(2005) conception has significant overlap with pragmatic constructivism; at
the other extreme Guba and Lincoln’s
(1989) “constructivist paradigm” falls
within post-modernism (Avenier,
2011); Klein and Myers’ (1999) conception, which specifically focuses on interpretive research of a hermeneutic
nature, occupies a sort of middle
ground.

posits social construction that reserves
agency to actors and, thereby, possibilities of changes subject to various
kinds of constraints. Some authors
such as Sandberg (2005) posit the intersubjective character of social situations to refer to the habits of thinking,
the ways of seeing and the shared
meanings among members of a group
who have been interacting over time,
which knit these people together. This
leads this author to posit that “the
agreed meaning constitutes the objective, intersubjective reality” (Sandberg,
2005, pp. 47-48).

1.3. Schematic overview
of the epistemological
frameworks’ founding
assumptions

Interpretive research can be more or
less critical in its “reading” of the social
world behind the words of the actors,
as a world characterized by power
structures, vested interests, and limited
resources to meet the goals of various
actors who construct and enact this social world (Klein and Myers, 1999).

Table 1 below offers a schematic
overview of the epistemological frameworks’ founding assumptions. It is
based upon a variety of texts (Bhaskar,
1978 and 1998a, b, c, d; Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Orlikowsky and Bouroudi,
1991; Gephart, 2004; Boisot and McKelvey, 2010; Avenier and Gavard-Perret, 2012…).

All these diverse schools of thought
share a common phenomenological
base that stipulates that human and
world are inextricably related through
lived experience (Sandberg, 2005). In
particular, our knowledge of reality is
gained only through social constructions such as language, consciousness,
shared meanings, documents, tools,
and other artifacts (Klein and Myers,
1999). Interpretive research attempts to
understand phenomena through the
meanings that people assign to them
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). It

The columns of Table 1 represent
ideal-types. Within each ideal-type,
there may exist diverse schools of
thought that introduce various nuances
and slight differences in certain assumptions, particularly in positivism
and interpretivism. For instance, Guba
and Lincoln (2007) consider that the
only generalization possible in interpretivism is descriptive generalization
whereas Klein and Myers emphasize
the goals of generalization in interpretive research (Klein and Myers, 1999)
and of improvement of social theories

70
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Epistemic realism: Real-asis is knowable (with possible fallibility of measurement instruments).

Record constant conjunctions of observable events.
Identify surface regularities and patterns.

Correspondence conception of knowledge.
Iconic representation of
real-as-is.
Falsifiable statements.

Epistemic
founding
assumptions

Goal of the
knowledge
generation
process

Status and
shape of
knowledge

Understand how human beings
make individual and/or collective
sense of their particular world and
engage in situations.

Epistemic relativism: ‘Facts’ are produced as part and parcel of the social
interaction of the researchers with the
participants and knowledge is gained
only through social constructions.
Lived experience is knowable. Intentionality has a constitutive power
on the meaning of reality that appears to us in our lived experience.

Ontological relativism: there exist
multiple socially constructed realities not governed by any natural
laws, causal or otherwise (Guba &
Lincoln, 1989).
The agreed meanings about a situation constitute the objective, intersubjective reality of this situation
(Sandberg, 2005).

Interpretivism
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Guba
& Lincoln, 1989, 2007; Klein &
Myers, 1999; Sandberg, 2005;
Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006;
Myers & Klein, 2011)

Field testable statements concerning Generic models
propositions.
GMs and activable propositions.

and

activable Narratives supported by thick descriptions, and, in certain currents within
interpretivism, generic statements.

Towards a correspondence conception Plausible interpretations that fit ex- Plausible interpretations that fit lived
of GMs, and a pragmatic conception of perience and are viable for inten- experience.
tionally acting.
the manner they are activated.

Build intelligible models of human
active experience, which provide insights for organizing the world of
experience.

Epistemic relativism in the following
sense: human experience is knowable, and in the knowledge process,
whatever stems from a situation is
inseparably intertwined with whatever stems from the inquirer.
The goal of inquiring influences the
inquirer’s experience of the situation.

Epistemic relativism, but not judgmental
relativism.
The real domain is not observable.
Events (actual domain) are observable.
Experienced events (empirical domain)
are knowable.

Identify the GMs that are responsible for
the events and patterns of events observed, as well as the manner by which
GMs are contingently activated.
The DREI process.

Humans experience resistance to
their actions.
No founding assumption on whatever resists human action.
Whatever resists human action possibly exists independently of human
attention.

Radical (also called
pragmatic) constructivism
(Glasersfeld, 1984, 2001; Le
Moigne,1995, 2001)

Ontological realism: Reality exists independently from human attention.
Reality is both intransitive and stratified.
Reality is constituted of three overlapping domains, those of the real, the actual, and the empirical.
Generative mechanisms (GMs) reside in
the real domain. Observable events
occur in the actual domain. Experienced
events lie in the empirical domain.

Critical realism
(Bhaskar, 1978, 1998a,b,c,d; Mingers,
2004; Mingers et al., 2013; Smith, 2006)

Table 1: Founding assumptions concerning knowledge’s origin and nature in alternative
epistemological frameworks

Ontological realism: Reality exists prior to and independently from human attention.
There exists a unique immutable “real-as-is”.

Ontological
founding
assumptions

Post-positivism
(Based upon Boisot &
McKelvey, 2010; Gephart,
2013…)
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in critical research carried out in an interpretive framework (Myers and
Klein, 2011).
The first two lines of Table 1 summarize epistemic and ontological founding
assumptions that were discussed in
§1.2. So, in this section, we mainly
focus on Table 1’s last two lines. They
synthesize the specific nature of the
knowledge developed in each epistemological framework by specifying the
goal of the knowledge generation process and the status of knowledge in
each framework. This enables us to
highlight that the goals of the knowledge generation process differ across
the various epistemological frameworks, and to draw the reader’s attention to the crucial importance of these
two aspects both for research and management practice. Indeed, on the one
hand, the research goal is what guides
the empirical study’s design as well as
the nature of the theoretical contribution. On the other hand, knowledge
status conditions the way the generated
knowledge can be used in IS, Management and Organization practice.
Below in this section, we first specify
the goal of knowledge generation in
the various epistemological frameworks, and then turn to the status of
generated knowledge in these frameworks.
In the positivist and post-positivist
traditions the science project aims to
record constant conjunctions of observable events (Mingers, 2013). As
such, the goal is mainly to identify surface similarities and patterns between
various instances of the phenomenon
under study. In critical realism, the
goal is to identify underlying structures

and generative mechanisms that give
rise to the flux of phenomena under
study. The identification of generative
mechanisms is usually performed as a
two-step process: the first step aims at
inductively identifying patterns. The
second and main step consists of formulating conjectures on the plausible
underlying generative mechanisms and
the contingent manner through which
they are activated, which would explain the observed patterns (Bhaskar,
1998c). To accomplish this, abduction
(also called retroduction, Bhaskar,
1998a) appears to be the most appropriate mode of reasoning (Mingers,
2004; Van de Ven, 2007; Boisot and
McKelvey, 2010). Thus theoretical explanation proceeds by Describing the
significant features of the events,
Retroducing possible causes – i.e. generative mechanisms –, Eliminating possible alternative explanations and
Identifying the generative mechanisms
at work (the DREI process, Bhaskar,
1998a; Mingers, 2013). In pragmatic
constructivism, the goal is to intelligibly build models that are functionally
fitted to experience and help to order
the domain of experience (Glasersfeld,
2001). This is basically achieved, as in
critical realism, through induction, abduction and conceptual assimilation
(Glasersfeld, 2001; Le Moigne, 1995).
In interpretivism, the goal is to understand how human beings make individual and/or collective sense of their
particular world and engage in situations (Klein and Myers, 1999; Sandberg, 2005). This diversity of meanings
sometimes coalesces around consensus (Guba and Lincoln, 2007). Another
possible goal is to attempt to relate
particulars identified in some context
to very abstract categories and con-
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cepts that can illuminate multiple situations (Klein and Myers, 1999; Sandberg, 2005).
The taxonomy of theory types proposed by Gregor (2006) highlights that
the positivist and post-positivist tradition favors either prediction, or explanation and prediction; critical realism
and pragmatic constructivism emphasize explanation; and interpretivism
privileges analysis or explanation.
However, if each epistemological tradition aims more or less at building explanations, the ways to build explanations, to generalize them, and to use
them for acting are very different depending on the epistemological framework in which the research is conducted.
Concerning knowledge status, in the
positivist and post-positivist traditions
knowledge represents the world “as it
is”: the world and the knowledge of
the world “may be viewed as surfaces
whose points are in isomorphic correspondence” (Bhaskar, 1998b, p. 19).
In critical realism the status of
knowledge relative to generative
mechanisms is not fully decided. Some
authors adopt a correspondence conception of generative mechanisms although they admit that the verification
or falsification of this knowledge will
never be conclusive (Tsang and Kwan,
1999; Tsang, 2006). In this line, authors
acknowledge that a perfect match between theories and reality is unlikely,
resulting in a base of knowledge that is
fallible but presumably less so over
time (Wynn and Williams, 2012). In
other words, they search for an approximation of reality. Tsang (2006)
points out that the correspondence

conception of knowledge should only
concern the central assumptions of
theories. Other authors like Denyer et
al. (2008) and Pascal et al. (2013) favor
a pragmatic conception of knowledge,
focusing on what these generative
mechanisms do in the empirical world,
i.e. their observable effects. As noted
by Tsoukas (2000), one can never be
certain whether one has got into the
“nature” of an object of study, i.e. has
represented it as it is.
In pragmatic constructivism, the conception of knowledge is pragmatic:
knowledge has the status of plausible
interpretations that fit experience and
offer viable markers for intentionally
acting. More precisely, knowledge
does not pretend to reflect world-aspossibly-functions; rather, it aims at offering viable ways and means of acting
and thinking that allow one to attain
the goals one happens to have chosen
(Glasersfeld, 2001). Consequently, in
IS, Management, and Organization
practice, knowledge is to be used as
heuristic markers for thinking and acting, rather than as offering precise
rules to be followed to the letter. It is
also used as a “sensitizing device” to
view the world in a certain way, according to the phrase used by Klein
and Myers (1999) to depict the way
knowledge is used in interpretivism.
In interpretivism knowledge has the
status of informed construction (Guba
and Lincoln, 1989) in which there is
agreement between the researcher’s
interpretation of the phenomenon
being studied and the meaning given
in lived experience by the individuals
involved in this phenomenon. This
agreement is progressively achieved
through an iterative process.
73
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In critical research carried out in an
interpretivist framework, knowledge is
specifically used as heuristic markers
that guide transformative redefinitions
(Myers and Klein, 2011).
Now that the conception of knowledge in each of the four epistemological frameworks considered in this article has been specified, we can
discuss how to develop valuable
knowledge in each of these frameworks, limiting ourselves to the case
of a qualitative method that is widely
diffused in IS, Organization and Management research, but can take on
very diverse forms: the case study
method.

2. JUSTIFICATION OF CASE
STUDY QUALITY
IN CONTEMPORARY
EPISTEMOLOGICAL
FRAMEWORKS
After a short description of generic
principles and notions for case study
quality, we successively examine the
specific meanings taken on by the notion of reliability, how internal quality
is justified, the goal of the theoretical
contribution, and the ways generalization is performed and tested in case
studies carried out in the four epistemological frameworks considered in
this paper.

2.1. Generic notions
and principles for case study
quality
The quest for research quality is
based on generic notions and princi-

ples such as reliability, inferences quality, constructs quality and generalization, which are fundamental in any research project that intends to be
recognized as being rigorously conducted (Gibbert et al., 2008). The spirit
of these principles holds regardless of
the research project’s epistemological
framework. However, their specific
meaning, and hence the way they are
justified and evaluated depend on the
research’s epistemological framework
(Amis and Silk, 2008; Avenier and
Gavard-Perret, 2012). For example, to
mark the difference of meanings that
the notion of reliability has in certain
frameworks, the term “reliability” is
sometimes replaced by “truthfulness”
(Sandberg, 2005), “trustworthiness”
(Guba and Lincoln, 1989; SchwartzShea 2006) and/or by “credibility”
(Charmaz, 2006) in interpretivist
frameworks. We prefer to use the same
term of reliability for all the epistemological frameworks, but underscore
that this term takes on different meanings in different epistemological frameworks.
Quality of inferences and constructs
depends on the rigor and the pertinence of the data collection and analysis. Construct quality is defined as the
ability to create clear classifications of
phenomena that structure experience
into meaningful categories (Suddaby,
2010). As such, construct quality is
first related to the quality of data collection and inferences that progressively allow the researcher to abstract
a construct from the data (Tsoukas,
2011). Second, it is also related to the
logical connections between the proposed new construct and other existing constructs (Suddaby, 2010). In
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other words, researchers need to precisely indicate the literature from
which they are drawing and to which
they are contributing (Suddaby, 2010).
In any epistemological framework, reliability, and quality of inferences and
constructs require an explicit description of how the empirical material was
collected and all the operations performed in relation with the empirical
material. The specific ways of building
quality in data collection and analysis
depend on the epistemological framework.
Generalization – also called external
validity in the positivist and post-positivist frameworks – refers to knowledge validity claims beyond the empirical basis upon which these
knowledge claims have been elaborated. Qualitative research is often presented as more favorable than quantitative research for elaborating
knowledge relevant for practice (Pratt,
2009). However, it is considered as
suffering numerous weaknesses when
it comes to justifying the validity of the
knowledge claims (Pratt, 2009), particularly generalizations made on the
basis of a single or even multiple case
studies (Gibbert et al., 2008). Indeed,
case study or small-N studies do not
allow generalization from the characteristic of a sample to those of the corresponding population (in other
terms, statistical generalization). However, as noted by numerous scholars
(Tsoukas, 2011; Lee and Baskerville
2003; Tsang and Williams, 2012), generalization can take multiple forms.
Lee and Baskerville (2003) identified
four forms of generalization: from Empirical statement to Empirical statement (E/E), from Empirical statement

to Theoretical statement (E/T), from
Theoretical statement to Empirical
statement (T/E), and from Theoretical
statement to Theoretical statement
(T/T). Two forms of generalization
can be used by researchers doing case
study, echoing Klein and Rowe
(2008). First the results of a case study
can be generalized by abstraction
(type E/T generalization). In the positivist framework, the E/T generalization is also called analytical generalization (Yin, 2009). It aims at clarifying
the theoretically necessary links between two or more characteristics of
the phenomenon studied in the case.
As we will see in more detail in the
following section, generalization
through abstraction for theory building can take different forms according
to the epistemological framework considered (Tsoukas, 2011). Second, researchers can use case studies to generalize previous theory (type T/E
generalization), applying theoretical
concepts to different settings. As
noted by Tsang and Williams (2012),
this kind of generalization is closely
related to empirical testing. According
to the epistemological framework, this
empirical testing can confirm or falsify
insights in a replication logic or contribute to refining extant theory in an
open-ended logic. In this later perspective, case studies offer “heuristic
generalization opportunities for refining our analytical understanding of
certain phenomena, namely opportunities for making more incisive distinctions
than
hitherto
available”
(Tsoukas, 2011: 295). This shows the
strong links that connect generalization and the research project’s main
purpose, be it theory-building, theoryrefinement or theory-testing.
75
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2.2. Conducting and justifying
the quality of (post-) positivist
case studies
2.2.1. Aim, design and mode
of reasoning
In positivism and post-positivism,
there are various types of case study
for generating or testing theory. The
first type of case study is the one described by Eisenhardt (1989, 1991); we
label this kind of method “exploratory
inductive” because it aims at identifying surface patterns via inductive reasoning based upon multiple case studies, without specifically searching for
underlying explanations of these patterns. The second type of case study is
deductive and is mainly used to test
theory (Dubé and Paré, 2003); thus we
prefer labelling this type of method,
which places a heavy emphasis on hypothesis testing (Yin, 2009), “deductive
testing case study” rather than “explanatory case study” as proposed by
Dubé and Paré (2003).
These two kinds of case studies combine within-case analysis with crosscase analysis. As such, they favor multiple-case design (Dubé and Paré,
2003). Within-case analysis serves to
identify new concepts and/or new relations between concepts. Then, replication of the study to various different
cases enables cross-case search for
patterns (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 540).
The goal is to show that the new relations observed under certain conditions between concepts or categories
in the first cases studied are also observed in the other cases under similar
conditions. Hence, here, replication
aims at verifying that the pattern initially identified holds across cases.

2.2.2. Justifying the quality
of “exploratory inductive”
or “deductive testing” case
studies
Reliability means subsequent researchers will arrive at the same results
if they conduct the study again, using
the same steps. More precisely, reliability concerns phenomena measurement;
measurement needs to be performed
with instruments (measurement scales,
questionnaires, etc.) that are reliable in
the following sense: measuring the
same phenomenon several times with
the same instrument should yield the
same results, independent of the person using the instrument.
The keywords are transparency and
replication. The prerequisite for allowing transparency and replication is
careful documentation and description
of how the entire case study has been
conducted. Two strategies are proposed to ensure reliability: the use of a
case study protocol and the development of a case study database (Yin,
1989, 2009; Dubé and Paré, 2003; Gibbert et al., 2008). A case study protocol
contains procedures and general rules
that should be followed in using the
diverse instruments (Dubé and Paré,
2003); combined with the data base,
the case study protocol allows replication and increases measurement reliability.
Quality of inferences is related to the
data analysis process; researchers have
to provide a detailed description of the
analytical procedures followed (Einsenhardt, 1989; Dubé and Paré, 2003).
The key point is to maintain a logical
chain of evidence that allows an external reviewer to follow the inferences
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made from raw material to ultimate
case study conclusions (Yin, 1989,
2009; Dubé and Paré, 2003). Crosscoding aims at building analysis neutrality and objectivity and hence participates in building research reliability.
On one hand, construct quality depends on the formulation of a clear research framework. For instance, for a
“deductive testing” case study, construct quality depends on whether theory triangulation – i.e. analyzing data
from different theoretical perspectives
(Yin, 2009) – has been performed; for
an “exploratory inductive” case study,
construct quality depends on whether
a clear a priori specification of constructs – without specifying the relations between them – guides the study
(Eisenhardt, 1989). On the other hand,
construct quality refers to the capacity
to build an accurate observation of the
reality (Gibbert et al., 2008). In positivist and post-positivist epistemological frameworks, construct quality
mainly depends on the quantity, precision, and variety of data collected. Several tactics are emphasized: multiple
data collection, mix of qualitative and
quantitative data, and data triangulation (Dubé and Paré, 2003; Gibbert et
al., 2008).
Knowledge produced by case studies, more particularly “explorative inductive” ones, is generalized via abstraction (E/T generalization, also
called analytical generalization). In analytical generalization, researchers aim
at identifying the necessary theoretical
links between two or more observable
characteristics of the phenomena studied and specifying them in terms of a
broader theoretical scheme (Tsoukas,
2011). However, in positivist and post-

positivist frameworks, knowledge generalization is mainly performed with a
replication slant, via empirical testing.
Indeed, the principle of reproducibility
plays a central role in this epistemological framework (Boisot and McKelvey,
2010). Since in the social sciences
identical replication through experimentation is rarely possible, knowledge claims external validity testing is
usually done via quantitative studies
that aim at testing various theoretical
hypotheses on samples representative
of the population to which the knowledge claims have been generalized.
Nevertheless, qualitative methods can
be used to confirm or falsify theories
such as in “deductive testing” case
study. But in practice they are little
used with this aim: according to Dubé
and Paré (2003), it represents a mere
9% of 183 positivist case studies published in seven major IS journals for
the period 1990 through 1999. Indeed,
concerning theory falsification, it can
always be argued that as theories are
simplifications, we are almost always
able to find instances in which a theory does not hold precisely; thus the difficulty is to convince the reader that
the case studied provides an important
insight provoking the violation of the
theory (Siggelkow, 2007).

2.3. Conducting and justifying
the quality of critical realist case
studies
2.3.1. Aim, design and mode
of reasoning
In critical realism, research methods
aim at developing, mainly via abductive reasoning (Mingers, 2004), specific
77

Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2015

17

061-98 Avenier_projet 04/06/15 10:36 Page78

Systèmes d'Information et Management, Vol. 20 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 4

SYSTÈMES D’INFORMATION ET MANAGEMENT

conjectures on plausible generative
mechanisms underlying the phenomena being investigated. Case study is
thus presented as the best approach to
exploring the interaction of structure,
events, actions, and context in order to
identify and formalize causal mechanisms (Wynn and Williams, 2012). We
have labeled these kinds of methods
“abductive explanatory” to differentiate them from “exploratory inductive
methods” – which are concerned with
directly observable surface relationships. Indeed, in abductive explanatory methods, researchers are principally
interested in abductively finding explanations for the events observed.
Researchers can develop a single
case study, mainly for theory building
or a multiple case study for theory refinement. For instance, Tsoukas’ (1989)
abductive explanatory conception of
comparative cases study – which differs from Eisenhardt’s (1989) exploratory inductive one – aims at enriching the current view of generative
mechanisms and of the manner in
which they are activated, through a
comparative analysis of different contextual conditions. In critical realism,
comparative case studies shed light on
the specific contingent conditions
under which the postulated generative
mechanisms combine and operate
(Tsoukas, 1989).

2.3.2. Justifying the quality
of “abductive explanatory” case
studies
In contrast with case studies carried
out in positivist and post-positivist
frameworks, in critical realism, social
phenomena are usually considered as

shaped by humans who act intentionally and can learn. This renders difficult reliably measuring social phenomena. But this does not prevent scholars
from attempting to understand the underlying reasons for their dynamics.
Besides, social phenomena are considered as taking place within open systems whose artificial closure for experimentation
purposes
possibly
generates important perturbations.
This makes replication of social phenomena difficult (Bhaskar, 1998b).
In critical realism – as well as in
pragmatic constructivism and interpretivism – the principle of reliability
mainly concerns the cognitive path
that leads from the empirical material
through to the research results: researchers have to give readers the
means to precisely follow the entire
cognitive path (Schwartz-Shea, 2006;
Charmaz, 2006). More precisely, researchers have to show how they have
controlled and checked their interpretations throughout the research process, from formulating the research
question through analyzing the data
obtained and reporting the results
(Sandberg, 2005). In particular, they
have to explain the way the analysis –
particularly the coding – was performed, as well as how the inferences
were drawn.
Quality of inferences refers to mapping out the pertinent configurational
patterns of the phenomenon studied
and trying to produce plausible explanations for the similarities and differences observed (Tsoukas, 1989). Similarities and differences are explained
by a combination of generative mechanisms and types of contingencies that
are responsible for their activation, in-
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volved in a particular setting. Building
a data structure as proposed by Gioia
et al. (2012) provides a graphic representation of how researchers progressed from raw data to terms and
themes in conducting the analyses—a
key component of demonstrating reliability and inferences quality.
Constructs consist of the structures,
the generative mechanisms and the
contextual conditions responsible for
the observed patterns of events. As
such, construct quality depends on the
explanatory power of the model elaborated (Glaser, 2004). The explanation
provided consists of the set of mechanisms which interact to generate the
most accurate representation of the
empirical world given our existing
knowledge. Thus, it is possible and required to compare the explanatory
power of the model elaborated to alternative theories (Wynn and Williams,
2012). Gioia et al. (2010) suggest that
one of the researchers can play the
role of the “devil’s advocate” by offering alternative explanations for developing findings. Finally, as in the previous tradition, construct quality also
depends on the quantity, precision,
and variety of data collected. The collected data has to provide the detailed
aspects of events being studied and a
thick description of the structural entities, constituent parts, and contextual
conditions existing in the case (Wynn
and Williams, 2012). Data collection
also involves asking the actors why the
events under investigation have taken
place (Tsoukas, 1989).
In critical realism, generalization
concerns the degree of abstraction of
the explanatory model elaborated. In
this approach, generality is not seen as

a feature of the empirical domain but
as a property of the necessary relations
in structures operating in the real domain (Tsoukas, 2011). As such, “generalization does not come from a movement of empirical events in one
context to empirical events in a novel
context, but rather it results from the
uncovering of the underlying essence
of things, a movement from surface to
depth” (Smith, 2006; p. 205). Thus,
case studies are generalizable insofar
as they provide an explanation of the
causal powers which are at work and
are capable of generating the observed
phenomena (Tsoukas, 2011).
The abstract explanatory model produced via case studies can be relentlessly modified and enriched through
testing it in qualitative research, permitting continual comparisons with
more and more data (Glaser, 2004).
Various methods can be used, such as
comparative cases study (Tsoukas,
1989) and “design-oriented research”
(Denyer et al., 2008; Pascal et al.,
2013). This latter is used for testing
prior knowledge claims, like those developed in evidence-based management. Such testing is performed within
comparative cases studies rather than
through replication, yet in a conception of scientific activity as “an ongoing
irreducibly empirical open-ended process” (Bhaskar, 1998c, p xii). Nonetheless, since Tsang and Kwan’s seminal
work (1999), certain authors (Mingers,
2006; Miller and Tsang, 2010) have
strived to develop methods aimed at
enabling a form of replication that is
more modest than in post-positivist
frameworks. Indeed, in this epistemological framework, verification and falsification cannot be definitive. Failure
79
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to replicate prior knowledge claims regarding structures or generative mechanisms in another context does not
constitute a falsification in Popper’s
sense, since this failure may be explained by contextual conditions or
counterbalancing generative mechanisms (Tsang and Kwan, 1999).

2.4. Conducting and justifying
the quality of pragmatic
constructivist case studies
2.4.1. Aim, design and mode
of reasoning
In pragmatic constructivism, knowledge generation aims at conceptualizing researchers’ understanding of their
flux of experience about the phenomena they investigate. More precisely researchers attempt to develop, particularly through abduction and conceptual
assimilation (Glasersfeld, 2001), principles for organizing in an intelligible
fashion the regularities they perceive in
their flux of experience (Avenier and
Parmentier Cajaiba, 2012). So, as in the
case of critical realism, “abductive explanatory case studies” are the most appropriate kind of case studies in pragmatic constructivism. In practice, the
main differences between knowledge
developed in these two epistemological frameworks do not concern the
knowledge process, but knowledge
goals and status.
Indeed, as already indicated above
(§1.3 and §2.3.1), in critical realism
knowledge aims at enriching the current views of generative mechanisms
and of the contingent conditions under
which these generative mechanisms
operate; the status of knowledge is one

of correspondence regarding generative mechanisms and a pragmatic one
regarding the manner generative mechanisms are activated. In pragmatic constructivism, knowledge aims at enriching the current understanding of
researchers’ flux of experiences in their
contexts and the modelling of these
understandings (Le Moigne, 2007). The
status of knowledge is pragmatic in the
sense that these understandings and
modellings have to constitute viable
markers for intentionally acting in situations of the sort that these understandings and modellings concern.
Consequently, in the next section we
will not repeat the methodological arguments developed for the justification
of “abductive explanatory case studies”
carried out in critical realism that also
hold in pragmatic constructivism. We
solely focus on the way these methodological arguments need to be adapted
or interpreted in pragmatic constructivism where required, as well as on
methodological arguments that are
specific to this framework.

2.4.2. Specifically justifying
the quality of “abductive
explanatory case studies”
in pragmatic constructivism
The arguments developed in §2.3.2
for reliability justification in critical realism straightforwardly hold in pragmatic constructivism.
In pragmatic constructivism, the
quality of inferences depends on the
intelligibility and cogency of the reasoning used in building the model
from the empirical material. For instance, in mapping out pertinent con-
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figurational patterns of the experience
of the phenomenon studied, and trying
to produce plausible explanations for
the similarities and differences perceived. Perceived similarities and differences are explained by a combination of modelling principles and types
of contextual conditions perceived to
prevail in a particular setting. Showing
a data structure as proposed by Gioia
et al. (2012) helps justifying reliability
and inferences quality.
In pragmatic constructivism, constructs consist of contextualized models
elaborated on the basis of a number of
extant modelling principles and theorizations. Construct quality depends on
the model’s functional fit in the context
under consideration and viability for
acting in this kind of context (Glasersfeld, 2001). Differently from critical realism, the mobilization of alternative
theories serves to critically and knowledgeably enrich constructs (Le Moigne,
1990) – rather than compare their respective explanatory powers. Construct
quality also depends on the richness of
the empirical material gathered regarding the processes involved in the phenomenon under investigation, the context of this phenomenon, the possible
individual and collective goals of the
actors involved in it, and background
information on the history of these processes, and of their contexts and goals
(Le Moigne, 1990).
As in critical realism, generalization
in pragmatic constructivism is conceptual: it goes from empirical material to
abstract statements and models. Generalization is performed with the aim of
intelligibly organizing flux of experiences in order to act intentionally in
various kinds of contexts. The empiri-

cal testing of these statements and
models is pragmatic. It is performed by
examining whether, in another context,
their re-contextualization according to
specificities of the new context provides functionally fitted and viable insights for a goal-directed intervention
in the new context (Avenier, 2010).
When performed in case studies, this
pragmatic empirical testing consists of
examining whether the re-contextualized knowledge provides functionally
fitted and viable markers for deciding
and carrying out a goal-directed intervention in the situation under consideration (Avenier and Parmentier Cajaiba,
2012). This testing cannot be solely accomplished by researchers, even those
acquainted with the setting, because
knowledge activation in a particular
setting demands local sense-making
and self-design by the practitioners involved in the goal-directed intervention
(Tenkasi et al., 2007). As in critical realism, failure of the model to offer viable
markers for acting in another context
does not constitute a falsification in
Popper’s sense but a signal that further
research needs to be carried out to understand the reasons for this failure
(Avenier and Gavard-Perret, 2012). This
can lead researchers to revise certain
underlying principles and adapt the
model accordingly.

2.5. Conducting and justifying
the quality of interpretivist case
studies
2.5.1. Aim, design and mode
of reasoning
Interpretive research of a hermeneutic nature is the most diffused approach
81
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in interpretivist IS, Organization and
Management research. So, in this paper,
following Klein and Myers (1999) and
Sandberg (2005), we focus on interpretivist case studies of a hermeneutic nature. These case studies aim at understanding the worlds of situational actors
from their perspective, by describing
how these actors make individual and
collective sense of their particular
world. Hence we name them “interpretive case studies”. These kinds of case
studies, among which we find the “natural inquiry” method (Lincoln and
Guba, 1985), explicitly draw on various
methodologies such as ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), hermeneutic
methodology (Gadamer, 1976) and
phenomenography (Marton, 1981).
These methods are usually conducted in unique case studies (Dyer and
Wilkins, 1991; Sandberg, 2005). Researchers provide “thick descriptions”
(Geertz, 1973; Schwartz-Shea, 2006) of
the context in which the meaningmaking and sense-making activities
under investigation took place, and a
narrative form of understanding based
upon the beliefs and desires of actors
(Bevir, 2006).
The main mode of reasoning in “interpretive descriptive case studies” is
hermeneutic. Sometimes, these case
studies also offer insights on how the
processes of interpretation, meaningmaking and engagement in situation
possibly operate.

2.5.2 Justifying the quality of
“interpretive case studies”
The following discussion is mainly
based on Klein and Myers’ (1999) and

Sandberg’s (2005) conceptions of research quality in interpretivism, which
complement each other. Indeed Klein
and Myers’ (1999) keywords for characterizing research quality are plausibility and cogency, whereas Sandberg
(2005) specifically discusses reliability
and validity criteria. These criteria can
appear more readily usable to certain
researchers than Klein and Myers’ principles for improving the plausibility
and cogency of interpretive accounts –
even though, like Klein and Myers’
(1999) principles, the use of these criteria requires considerable creative
thinking.
First, we briefly recall Klein and
Myers’ seven principles. Then we
show how Sandberg’s criteria connect
to these principles, which are as follows:
1. The principle of the hermeneutic
circle suggests that all human understanding is achieved by iterating between considering the interdependent
meaning of parts and the whole that
they form. This principle of human understanding is fundamental to all the
other principles.
2. The principle of contextualization
requires that the subject matter be set
in its social and historical context. It is
noteworthy that the spirit in which this
is done differs from a positivist account of history.
3. The principle of interaction between the researcher and the subjects
requires critical reflection on how the
research materials (or “data”) were socially constructed through the interaction between the researchers and participants.
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4. The principle of abstraction and
generalization. Even though interpretive research is idiographic, intrinsic to
interpretive research is the attempt to
relate particulars to very abstract categories. This abstraction process is
sometimes called “descriptive generalization” (Guba and Lincoln, 2007).
5. The principle of dialogical reasoning requires sensitivity to possible contradictions between the theoretical
preconceptions guiding the research
design and actual findings (“the story
which the data tells”) with subsequent
cycles of revision.
6. The principle of multiple interpretations requires sensitivity to possible
differences in interpretations among
the participants.
7. The principle of suspicion requires
critical thinking and “reading” the social world behind the words of the actors, a social world that is characterized by power structures, vested
interests, and limited resources.
Sandberg’s (2005) criteria are based
upon the conception of truth as “intentional fulfillment” that holds in interpretivism. Intentional fulfillment means
that there is agreement between the
researcher’s interpretation of the phenomenon being studied and the meaning given by research participants in
lived experience. Sandberg (2005)
views intentional fulfillment as a “truth
constellation” that comprises various
aspects that complement each other.
He derives from this truth constellation
three validity criteria to be used iteratively, namely communicative, pragmatic and transgressive validity criteria.

Communicative validity focuses on
meaning coherence, stipulating that interpretations should be made coherent
with the empirical material constituted
and investigated. The principle of coherence is based upon the hermeneutic circle and requires implementing an
iterative process where conflicting interpretations can be judged with respect to how coherent they are with
the empirical material. Hence communicative validity is directly connected
to Klein and Myers’ (1999) principles 1,
2, 3 and 5.
Pragmatic validity addresses the
issue of possible discrepancy between
what people say they do and what
they actually do. Building pragmatic
validity involves searching for such
possible discrepancy by asking followup questions that constantly embed
the statements in concrete situations,
or through participant observation.
Hence communicative validity is directly related to Klein and Myers’
(1999) principles 6 and 7. Sandberg
(2005) underscores that the most extensive way to check interpretations is
testing them in practice, but this often
requires a separate study in which the
findings are re-contextualized into the
practice being investigated. This view,
which is not present in Klein and
Myers’ principles, brings Sandberg’s
conception of interpretivism closer to
pragmatic constructivism than to Guba
and Lincoln’s (1989) interpretivism.
Transgressive validity draws the researcher’s attention to possible irresolvable contradictions and tensions,
which may be overlooked in the quest
for communicative and pragmatic validity. Hence it is directly connected to
Klein and Myers’ principle 6. By sys83
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tematically looking for differences and
contradictions rather than coherence in
lived experience, this criterion challenges and complements the criterion
of communicative validity.
For Sandberg (2005), the principal
question of reliability is about achieving interpretations truthful to lived experience where truth is conceived as
intentional fulfillment. Given this conception of truth, criteria of reliability,
such as replicability and interjudge reliability of results relating to objective
reality, fall outside the domain of interest in achieving reliability within interpretivist approaches. Instead, the proposed truth constellation implies first
and foremost that researchers must
show how they controlled and
checked their interpretations throughout the research process, i.e. how they
dealt with their subjectivity. Acknowledging subjectivity does not mean accepting ‘biased subjectivity’ that occurs
for instance when one principally
takes note of statements that support
one’s opinions, selectively interprets
statements so one can justify one’s
own conclusions, and tends to ignore
counter evidence.
To sum up, Klein and Myers’ (1999)
principles for interpetivist case study
quality and Sandberg’s (2005) reliability and validity criteria are mutually
consistent. They also complement
each other. Indeed, Klein and Myers
highlight abstraction and descriptive
generalization, whereas Sandberg precisely specifies the notion of reliability
in interpretivist research, and highlights the importance of “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973) and treating all
the aspects of the lived experience
under investigation as equally impor-

tant – in particular, giving equal voice
to all individuals involved. In addition,
Sandberg (2005) suggests the possibility of pragmatically testing descriptive
generalizations, which is fairly unusual
in interpretivist guidelines and situates
his conception of interpretivist research closer to pragmatic constructivist research than most other conceptions.

2.5.3. Focus on interpretivist
critical case studies
Because of the particular relevance
critical research has in IS research, we
think it is important to briefly discuss
critical case studies. One difficulty is
that of substantial diversity within the
critical research philosophy: there is
no single coherent theoretical foundation (Myers and Klein, 2011). However, all critical studies share two characteristics: they rely on a strong
theoretical base that includes taking a
value position and a critical stance towards the way things are, and they
offer suggestions on the way things
could be that would bring improvements to society (Myers and Klein,
2011). Since critical research shows
similarities with interpretivist research
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991), concentrating on critical case studies conducted in the framework of interpretivism makes sense and permits one to
develop a fairly consistent view of
these kinds of case studies. Hence, in
this section we focus on the specific
principles and criteria for quality of interpretivist critical case studies which
apply beyond the generic ones that
apply for interpretivist case studies in
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general – which were discussed in the
previous section.
The two features evoked above that
are specific to critical studies have several consequences on the research design of critical interpretivist case studies. Particularly, data collection and
analysis are organized around core
concepts from critical social theorists;
and researchers subject the value position they take to continual critical reflection, as well as the concept they
mobilize. In particular researchers engage in challenging prevailing assumptions, beliefs, values and practices that
are often taken for granted, with potentially conflicting arguments and evidence. The special features of critical
case studies also condition the kind of
knowledge that is generated, namely
knowledge oriented toward facilitating
the realization of human needs and
potential, critical self-reflection and associated self-transformation, i.e. fostering participants’ reflexivity (Rowe,
2009), as well as individual emancipation, improvements in society and in
social theories (Myers and Klein,
2011). In other words, the knowledge
generated is not limited to interpretive
descriptions. It also suggests how
things could be, given the constraints
associated with the current circumstances – for instance how unwarranted uses of power might be overcome
(Myers and Klein, 2011).
Myers and Klein (2011) underscore
that although data collection and analysis are supposed to be organized
around the core concepts from one or
more critical social theorists, this does
not mean that these concepts should
remain unchallenged or that new ones
might not emerge. Rather, the theoret-

ical apparatus mobilized should be
subject to change, partly in response to
new historical discoveries or empirical
data on current social changes, and
partly in response to new theoretical
reasoning and debate. Indeed, critical
theorists believe that our theories are
fallible and that improvements in social theories are possible through critique and debate. Theory testing is accomplished in critical case studies
through the use of theory as a “sensitizing device” to view the world in a
certain way (Myers and Klein, 2011).
Differently from the situation in pragmatic constructivist case studies, the
social transformations and the emancipatory actions suggested in a critical
case study do not constitute a means
to pragmatically test the knowledge
that has been generated in the study.
These transformative actions are ends
in themselves. All this suggests that in
IS especially, some critical research
should be seeking to improve sociotechnical theory (Myers and Klein,
2011).

2.6. Synthesis Table
Table 2 synthesizes the insights offered throughout §2 on how to design
and conduct rigorous case studies
within each of the four epistemological
frameworks considered in the article.
The column “Interpretivism” also highlights specific quality principles of interpretivist critical case studies, which
apply beyond those referring to interpretivist case studies in general.
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Construct quality depends on the
explanatory power of the model
elaborated, generating the most accurate explanation of the empirical
world given our existing knowledge.
It also depends on the quantity,
precision, and variety of data collected on events, social structures,
contextual conditions and actors’
accounts of the reasons why the
events under investigation have
taken place.

Construct
quality

Construct quality depends
on the formulation of a
clear research framework
and the quantity, precision, and variety of data
collected (multiple data
collection, mix of qualitative and quantitative data,
and data triangulation).

Quality of inferences is related to
producing plausible explanations
for the similarities and differences
observed.

Inferences qual- Elucidation of the analytiity
cal procedures followed.
Maintaining a chain of evidence from raw data to
ultimate conclusions.

Construct quality depends
on the richness of the empirical material constituted
as well as on the model’s
functional fit in the context under consideration
and on its viability for acting in this context.
Reflective critique

Quality of inferences depends on the intelligibility
and cogency of the reasoning used in building
the model from the empirical material.

Construct quality depends
on the communicative,
pragmatic and transgressive validity of interpretations.
Equal voice needs to be
given to all actors concerned by the study.
Reflexivity

Construct quality depends
on the organization of
data collection and analysis around core concepts
from critical social theorists as well as on bringing
to light inconsistent and
even conflicting findings.
Voice to be given particularly to marginalized or
disadvantaged groups.

Consistency of the inferences with the value position taken.

Quality of inferences is evaluated in terms of the plausibility and cogency of the logical reasoning used in describing the research process and how conclusions were
drawn from the empirical material, particularly showing
how the hermeneutic circle was used.

Truthfulness, Trustworthiness, Credibility
Thick descriptions
Showing how interpretations of empirical material were
controlled and checked throughout the research process.

Intelligibility and cogency of the
cognitive path: provide an explicit
description of how researchers
progress from raw data to terms
and themes in conducting the analyses, as in Gioia et al.’s (2012)
method.

Transparency, replication
and measurement reliability based on a case study
protocol and a case study
database.
Cross coding participates
in building analysis’ neutrality and objectivity, and
thus research reliability

Reliability
Intelligibility and cogency
of the cognitive path: provide an explicit description
of
how
researchers
progress from raw material
to the knowledge elaborated, as in Strauss & Corbin
(1990) or Gioia et al.
(2012).

Explicit description of how the empirical material was collected and all the operations performed in relation with the empirical material.
The specific ways of performing data collection and analysis depend on the epistemological framework.

Prerequisite
of quality

Interpretivist critical case
studies

Interpretivism

explanatory Interpretive case studies

Pragmatic
constructivism

Exploratory inductive case Abductive explanatory case studies Abductive
studies, or deductive testcase studies
ing case studies

Critical realism

Types of case
studies

Positivism
and Post-positivism
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Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991; Tsoukas, 1989; Wynn & Williams, Goldkuhl, 2008, 2012; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Myers & Klein, 2011.
Yin, 1989, 2009; Dubé & 2012.
Avenier & Parmentier Ca- Klein & Myers, 1999; SandParé, 2003
jaiba, 2012; Parmentier Ca- berg, 2005.
Gibbert et al., 2008.
jaiba & Avenier, 2013; Albert & Couture, 2014.

Markus, 1983; Pinsonneault Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012. Williams & Albert & Couture, 2013; Sandberg,
& Kraemer, 1993; Ozcan & Karahanna, 2013.
Mazmanian et al., 2014.
2011.
Eisenhardt, 2009; Bingham Pascal et al., 20133
Lindgren et al., 20044
& Eisenhardt, 2011.

Examples of
methodological
guidelines

Examples of
case studies

Pragmatic
testing
of
knowledge’s functional fit
and viability for intentionally acting in the kind of
situations investigated.
Testing carried out in qualitative studies, particularly
in design research and action research.

2000;

Testing through critique
and debate in subsequent
critical case studies or action research.

Cope, Young, Kuo & Myers 2012;
Ravishankar, Pan & Myers,
2013.

Conceptual generalizations can possibly be pragmatically tested in further
qualitative studies (Sandberg, 2005).

3,4

The examples of design research (Pascal et al., 2014) and action research (Lindgren et al., 2004) – which are not examples of case study research stricto sensu
– are cited to illustrate ways for pragmatically testing knowledge respectively in critical realism and in pragmatic constructivism discussed in this paper.

Table 2: Case study quality justification in the various epistemological frameworks

Testing of the Generative Mechanisms’ activation in the empirical
field can be pragmatically performed in qualitative studies (theory refinement) and/or via quantitative methods (theory testing).

Confirmation or falsification via “deductive testing”
case studies and mainly
via
quantitative
studies.
Emphasizing the replication logic.

Conceptual generalization
via abstraction for developing or improving social
theories.

Future testing

Generalization via abstrac- Descriptive generalization.
tion. Generalization is Possible conceptual generdriven by the aim of intel- alizations via abstraction.
ligibly bringing flux of experiences into a logical
order to offer heuristic
markers for intentionally
acting in various kinds of
contexts.

Generalization via abstraction.
Generalization results from the uncovering of the underlying essence
of things, a movement from surface
to depth.

Theory building
Theory refinement

Generalization via abstraction: analytical generalization for “exploratory inductive” case study.
Generalization consists of
identifying and clarifying
the necessary theoretical
links between two or more
observable characteristics
of the phenomenon studied.

Theory building
Theory refinement

Interpretivism

Generalization
Mode

Theory building
Theory refinement

Pragmatic
constructivism

Theory building
Theory refinement

Critical realism

Theoretical con- Theory building
tribution
Theory testing

Positivism
and Post-positivism
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3. DISCUSSION
This discussion is organized around
three main points. First, we highlight
the commonalities and differences between quality principles in two epistemological frameworks that are located
in the epistemic transition zone (Johnson et al., 2006), namely critical realism and pragmatic constructivism.
Then we discuss the importance of explicitly inscribing any single research
project in an epistemological framework, and, in the third point, argue
that the multiplicity of epistemological
frameworks mobilized in the disciplines considered in this article provides richness to each of these disciplines.

3.1. Main commonalities
and differences between critical
realism and pragmatic
constructivism
In this paper we have considered
four epistemological traditions: positivism and post-positivism, critical realism, pragmatic constructivism, and interpretivism. This classification has two
main advantages. First, it combines the
various possible combinations between assumptions of ontological realism vs. ontological relativism (OR vs.
ORel) on the one hand, and epistemic
realism vs. epistemic relativism (ER vs.
ERel) on the other one. Indeed, positivism and post-positivism posit
(OR/ER), critical realism (OR/ERel),
pragmatic constructivism (-/ERel), and
interpretivism (ORel/ERel); and the
combination of ontological relativism
with epistemic realism does not make
sense. Secondly, this classification

takes into account two growing epistemological traditions that occupy an intermediary position between positivism and interpretivism: critical
realism and pragmatic constructivism.
To further understand these two traditions located in the epistemological
transition zone (Johnson et al., 2006),
we wish to emphasize their main commonalities and differences.
As seen before, critical realism posits
ontological realism together with a
stratified conception of reality and at
the same time, accepts the relativism of
knowledge. Pragmatic constructivism
has the following property: for the
sake of framing a particular research
project conducted in this epistemological framework, scholars have the possibility of taking any beliefs concerning
the possible nature of the world (that
are consistent with their experience of
that world) as working assumptions,
particularly the critical realist ones or
the interpretivist ones. The only condition is to explicitly state these working
assumptions at the start of the project,
define a research design consistent
with them, and recall them when presenting the research results (Avenier,
2010). This opening creates possible
overlaps between research done in
pragmatic constructivism and critical
realism or interpretivism.
As highlighted by Table 2, the methods for knowledge generation and for
empirically testing generalizations appear fairly similar in critical realism
and pragmatic constructivism. However, even though knowledge claims can
be developed with similar methods,
the differences in these frameworks’
ontological founding assumptions induce differences in the status of
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knowledge in these two frameworks.
In critical realism, knowledge aims at
describing the (postulated) deep reality as-is, and hence concerns ontology:
knowledge developed about generative mechanisms is supposed to describe how these (postulated) generative mechanisms function in various
contexts. The higher the conceptual
level of knowledge about generative
mechanisms, the deeper the level of
reality where these generative mechanisms are located. In pragmatic constructivism, conceptual knowledge
does not pretend to provide an iconic
description of whatever possibly exists; rather it aims at offering intelligible and functionally fitted models to
viably deal with the world of experience. Hence it concerns flux of experiences rather than ontology.
This difference in knowledge status
induces important differences in the
way knowledge can be used in practice. Since the knowledge developed
in critical realism is supposed to provide plausible explanations of how the
world functions, it offers solidly-argued grounds upon which to make decisions for intervening adequately in a
situation, taking into account the role
of the contexts in generative mechanisms’ activation. Thus, the knowledge
developed in critical realism does not
provide law-like rules but heuristic
propositions based upon the explanatory power of generative mechanisms.
In pragmatic constructivism, knowledge does not pretend to provide descriptions of how the world functions,
but functionally fitted and viable models for dealing with the world of experience. These models are to be used as
heuristic markers supporting open re-

flections and discussions on how to
adequately intervene in a situation.

3.2. The importance of explicitly
inscribing any single research
project in an epistemological
framework
In this paper, we have shown that
the goal of theory-building and the
form of research results depend on the
research’s epistemological framework,
and that the validity of research results
can only be justified in reference to a
certain vision of what is knowledge,
i.e. in reference to an epistemological
framework. So, in this respect, our
contribution is in agreement with a
number of authors’ views, such as
Klein and Myers (1999), Gephart
(2004), Sandberg (2005), Johnson et al.
(2006), Amis and Silk (2008) and Easterby-Smith et al. (2008), as well as with
those of Morgan and Smircich (1980),
Cunliffe (2011) and Keutel et al.
(2014). We supplement these authors’
works in two ways: (1) we consider
various epistemological frameworks
that are not discussed in the classifications that they use; (2) for every epistemological framework considered in
the current paper, we exhibit some key
markers to help researchers rigorously
conduct case study research.
In the main body of the paper, we
have argued that the validity of research results depends on the fit between the method effectively implemented and the research project’s
epistemological framework. However,
we highlighted that the relationship
between kind of research method and
kind of epistemological framework is
not a one-to-one relationship. For in89
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stance, as seen above, case study can
be used to generate knowledge in very
different epistemological frameworks.
But when researchers want to mobilize
this kind of method, they have to implement it in fairly different ways, depending on the epistemological framework of the research project. Providing
researchers with this crucial information and explanations would considerably help them to make sound
methodological decisions and furthermore, foster overall improvement of
quality of qualitative research in a pluralistic field. As such, we participate in
increasing authors’ as well as reviewers’ general understanding of different
epistemological traditions. This considerably helps authors locate and make
explicit their own underlying philosophical assumptions and be informed
as to how case studies ought to be
shaped and judged depending on the
tradition to which they subscribe (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Keutel et al.,
2014). Therefore, the proposed contingent “criteriology” (Johnson et al.,
2006) synthetized in Table 2 constitutes a heuristic device to critically and
knowledgeably use case study within
different epistemological traditions,
echoing Mingers (2001) recommendations.
From this perspective, this article
provides some guidelines for increasing methodological diversity particularly in doing case study, but not at the
expense of rigor. Indeed, a deep understanding of the quality criteria corresponding to the epistemological tradition in which the research is
conducted allows researchers to mindfully explore different possible design
alternatives and to sometimes try new

designs in order to capture the most of
this research strategy’s potential (Keutel et al., 2014).

3.3. The multiplicity of epistemological frameworks as a richness
for the disciplines
Even though we have just argued
that it is essential to inscribe any single
research project in an explicit epistemological framework, and even
though any individual researcher probably feels more inclined to inscribe
their research projects in a particular
epistemological framework and use a
particular research method, this does
not mean that we consider that any of
the disciplines of IS, Organization, and
Management sciences should subscribe to one and only one epistemological framework.
On the contrary, along with numerous scholars (e.g. Myers and Klein,
2011, and Hassan, 2014 in the IS field),
we consider that pluralism is essential
in these disciplines. Indeed, “pluralism
is not problematic; quite the opposite,
it speaks to the very vitality of the field
of organizational studies” (Amis and
Silk, 2008, p. 475). Pluralism in philosophical, theoretical and methodological positions is a great asset to these
disciplines (Romme et al., 2015, forthcoming). “Using different theory-building approaches to study disparate issues is a better way of fostering more
comprehensive portraits of complex
organizational phenomena” (Gioia and
Pitre, 1990).
Gioia and Pitre’s (1990) notion of
meta-paradigm perspective amounts to
considering that Mingers’s (2001) view
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according to which methods can be
detached from the epistemological
frameworks in which they have initially been developed, and critically and
knowledgeably used within a context
that makes different assumptions, also
applies to the use of knowledge itself.
This means that in any research project, it may be possible to integrate elements developed in another epistemological framework, albeit not in an
arbitrary manner (Myers and Klein,
2011), but critically and knowledgeably – i.e. by reinterpreting them according to the founding assumptions
of the epistemological framework in
which knowledge integration takes
place. Indeed, any meta-paradigm perspective is nonetheless rooted in a specific paradigm, that to which the researcher subscribes (Gioia and Pitre,
1990).

gence in the forms that it takes (Johnson et al., 2006). In this paper we have
developed a heuristic framework for
guiding the design of a rigorous case
study depending on the research’s goal
and epistemological framework. This
framework can also provide guidance
to reviewers in their evaluations. We
have also highlighted the fundamental
reasons – namely the epistemological
ones – for differences in the guidelines
offered in the literature for conducting
high quality case studies. As such, we
propose a set of contingent criteria to
be used as a heuristic device to critically and knowledgeably build rigorous
case studies within different epistemological traditions following Mingers’
(2001) recommendations. In line with
Keutel et al. (2014) we argue for more
mindfulness regarding the design and
accomplishment of case studies.

This is precisely what Denyer et al.
(2008) propose to do for developing
design propositions through research
synthesis in a critical realist framework.
In the same spirit, Romme and Van
Burg (2014) offer a critical realism-affiliated methodological framework for
research synthesis in entrepreneurship
which fosters reflectively integrating
knowledge developed in positivist, interpretive, and pragmatic epistemological frameworks.

Naturally, we recognize that evaluation criteria are historically and socially
constructed philosophical conventions.
Especially, they express competing justificatory logics to control the discipline’s formal evaluation system, determining
what
constitutes
valid
knowledge (Sandberg, 2005). Nevertheless, identifying these conventions
and rendering them explicit is crucial
to understanding how to legitimize a
particular research project in a certain
epistemological framework, to critically and knowledgeably use methods
(Mingers, 2001), and to suggest the use
of specific evaluation criteria (Johnson
et al., 2006). Moreover, embracing and
articulating different sets of epistemological assumptions could function as a
means of communication between
schools of thought, and may serve to
empower
mutual
understanding

CONCLUSION
The expanding popularity of qualitative research, and more particularly
case study, in the fields of Information
Systems, Organization and Management research, seems to have been accompanied by an increasing diver-
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through dialogue with, and receptiveness to the philosophical assumptions
of others (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008).
Last but not least, this study has important implications for research practice. First, from the very start of a research
project,
specify
its
epistemological framework. We have
emphasized that underlying any form
of research there is a philosophy of
knowledge – otherwise known as an
epistemological framework. However,
the underlying philosophy of knowledge remains more often implicit than
explicit. Nowadays, since various
solidly-argued epistemological frameworks are available, it is important to
choose one deliberately when undertaking research, rather than to inherit
one by default (Van de Ven, 2007).
Second, researchers need to be mindful to maintain the internal consistency
of the research design, particularly
consistency between the epistemological framework, the goal of research
(namely, theory building, theory refinement or theory testing) and the implemented method. Finally, it is advisable to focus submissions on academic
journals open to the research epistemological framework.
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